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Abstract 
Though there is a tension between citizens’ privacy concerns and their acceptance of 
government surveillance, there is little systematic research in this space, and less still in a 
cross cultural context. We address the research gap by modeling the factors that drive public 
acceptance of government surveillance, and by exploring the influence of national culture. 
The research involved an online survey of 242 Australian and Sri Lankan residents. Data was 
analyzed using PLS, revealing that privacy concerns around initial collection of citizens’ data 
influenced levels of acceptance of surveillance in Australia but not Sri Lanka, whereas 
concerns about secondary use of data did not influence levels of acceptance in either country. 
These findings suggest that respondents conflate surveillance with the collection of data and 
may not consider subsequent secondary use. We also investigate cultural differences, finding 
that societal collectivism and power distance significantly affect the strength of the 
relationships between privacy concerns and acceptance of surveillance, on the one hand, and 
adoption of privacy protections, on the other. Our research also considers the role of trust in 
government, and perceived need for surveillance. Findings are discussed with their 
implications for theory and practice. 
Introduction 
In recent years, citizens in many jurisdictions have found themselves subject to increasing 
levels of routine government surveillance (Denemark, 2012) which takes many forms. While 
there is debate about exactly what constitutes surveillance and when it occurs (Bernal, 2016; 
Marx, 2015) it is essentially concerned with the strategic collection of information of data 
about citizens (Trüdinger & Steckermeier, 2017). Collection of data can occur in offline and 
online environments, and government surveillance strategies may involve direct collection of 
citizens’ personal information or may require data to be collected and provided by third 
parties.  As an example of the latter, a recently implemented metadata retention regime in 
Australia mandates that communications service providers log their customers’ location data 
and online activities for two years (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015).  
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Online surveillance of citizens (as with offline surveillance) is generally justified for its role 
in the prosecution and prevention of crime and the prevention of activities that threaten 
national security (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015).  Nevertheless, 
members of the public are often opposed to such measures and may seek ways to avoid being 
monitored (Joh, 2013). There is some anecdotal evidence that this is the case. For example, 
internet searches for privacy protections such as virtual private networks (VPN) or Tor 
increased immediately after Edward Snowden’s leaks regarding government surveillance, and 
later after the implementation of the metadata retention legislation in Australia (Google 
Trends, 2018a, 2018b). 
Public acceptance of surveillance is influenced by various factors, including privacy concerns 
(Dinev & Hart, 2006; Dinev, Hart, & Mullen, 2008), the perceived need for surveillance 
(Brown & Korff, 2009; Dutton, Guerra, Zizzo, & Peltu, 2005), and trust in the government 
(Trüdinger & Steckermeier, 2017). Much research as to the factors that influence public 
acceptance of government surveillance has been conducted in the US context; however, 
revelations about Edward Snowden’s leaks have led to increased interest in the government 
surveillance perceptions of citizens in other countries (e.g., Adams Andrew, 2017a, 2017b; 
Murata, 2017a; Murata, 2017b). There has also been little research into whether the use of 
privacy protections is influenced by acceptance of government surveillance and privacy 
concerns and to what extent national culture plays a role in influencing public acceptance of 
surveillance or the adoption of privacy protections. The latter question is particularly 
important given culture is one factor that informs public opinion about surveillance (Hallinan 
& Friedewald, 2012). Moreover, an increasing number of privacy scholars advocate for a 
more contextual approach to information privacy (Wu, Vitak, & Zimmer, 2019) and 
surveillance clearly implicates privacy, although is not necessarily in opposition to it (Marx, 
2015). 
Our research sought to discover some of the factors that influence public acceptance of 
government surveillance in the online environment, as well as factors that influence the 
uptake of privacy protections. References to “government surveillance” in the context of our 
model, therefore, are references to online government surveillance. Our central research 
questions are twofold. First: What are the determinants of acceptance of government 
surveillance and the use of privacy protections? Second: Does national culture influence the 
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strength of any relationship between privacy concerns, acceptance of surveillance and the 
adoption of privacy protections?  
We address the research gap by developing a model that considers factors previously found to 
drive public acceptance of government surveillance, as well as factors thought to influence 
the adoption of privacy protections. We then empirically evaluate this model by gathering 
survey data from 242 residents of Australia and Sri Lanka and analyzing the results using 
partial least squares (PLS) structural equation modelling. In the remaining sections of the 
paper, we consider the background and justification for our hypotheses, followed by our data 
analysis and discussion of results. The paper closes by considering implications for both 
theory and practice. 
Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 
While state surveillance of citizens has increased — due, in part, to the opportunities provided 
by new technologies (Reddick, Chatfield, & Jaramillo, 2015) — public views on that 
surveillance are mixed (Dinev et al., 2008; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security, 2015; Rainie & Madden, 2015; Robert, 2015) and may not be well understood 
(Reddick et al., 2015). Much of the research into factors that influence public acceptance of 
surveillance has been conducted in the US, yet differences in national legal frameworks and 
cultural norms, among other things, are likely to impact upon the extent to which citizens 
accept such surveillance and the factors that influence that acceptance. Moreover, it is 
possible that the national context may influence the extent to which individuals adopt privacy 
protective measures, as well as the type of measures they take. For example, Adams Andrew 
(2017b) found that Spanish citizens are relatively accepting of government surveillance if 
they perceive a benefit to society. However, Wu et al. (2019) suggest that individuals in 
authoritarian regimes may face greater privacy risks vis-à-vis those in authority. It is possible, 
therefore, that those individuals would be more likely to adopt protective measures.  
Our study is also motivated by current events in Australia and Sri Lanka. Following the 
introduction in 2015 of a national metadata retention regime, at the end of 2018 Australia 
passed so-called “encryption laws”. These encryption laws introduced measures that compel 
communications providers to assist law enforcement and security agencies to deal with the 
challenges posed by “ubiquitous encryption” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
2018). In 2018, following an outbreak of communal violence in Sri Lanka (Safi & Perera, 
5 
 
2018) the President of Sri Lanka revealed plans for “implementing the necessary monitoring 
and surveillance methods to ensure the public safety” (Sri Lanka Government, 2018).  
Hallinan and Friedwald (2012) identify two reasons why public perceptions of government 
surveillance practices are important: firstly, because public opinion is a “shaping factor…in 
the development of surveillance technologies and surveillance infrastructures” (p.2); and 
secondly because in democratic societies public opinion should shape public policy. 
Similarly, as the Australian Law Council has recently observed in relation to proposed 
identity-matching legislation, the government should be “highly conscious of how the law is 
seen to operate and, in particular, maintain robust levels of transparency and accountability” 
(Bailes, 2018).  Public acceptance of surveillance may be important for other reasons, 
however a lack of public support for surveillance measures could “undermine government 
efforts to increase protection for the public” (Dinev et al., 2008, p. 227). In this research, we 
study several potential determinants of public acceptance of surveillance, including privacy 
concerns, perceived need for surveillance, and trust in government. We also investigate 
whether national culture plays a role. The theoretical foundation of our research builds on the 
model developed by Dinev et al. (2008), which we extend with constructs from other related 
work (e.g. Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2003; Trüdinger & Steckermeier, 2017). Figure 1 
shows the proposed research model. The justifications for the inclusion of these constructs 
and the associated hypotheses are discussed in the following sections. 
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Fig 1: Research model 
 
National culture 
Stemming from the work of Kluckhohn (1962 ), scholars have proposed models to explain 
and understand how members of a society share beliefs and values. Most prominent among 
these is Hofstede’s model (2011) which describes a national culture in terms of six 
dimensions; in this model, culture is defined as “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (p.3). Although 
every collective is comprised of individuals, in aggregate the members of a collective often 
exhibit similar patterns along the six dimensions. Differences in cultural dimensions are 
associated with differences in privacy concerns in some domains. For example, high power 
distance has been shown to be related to higher levels of concerns over social network 
services (SNS) privacy, and higher levels of individualism have been found to be related to 
lower levels of privacy concerns (Cecere, Le Guel, & Soulié, 2015). Differences in these 
dimensions may also have implications for how members of a society accept government 
surveillance or how they enact measures to protect their privacy. Given their relevance to 
privacy and surveillance, and the fact that there are marked differences between Australia and 
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Sri Lanka in respect of these two dimensions (Hofstede Insights, 2019), we focus on the 
dimensions of individualism/collectivism and power distance.  
Power distance refers to the extent to which members of a society accept that power 
distribution is unequal. It suggests that inequality in society is endorsed not only by leaders 
but also by the mainstream. Put simply, members of a high power distance culture expect to 
be told what to do. With a relatively high score of 80 (out of 120), Sri Lanka can be 
considered to be towards the higher side in terms of power distance. Australia ranks far 
lower, scoring 36 in this dimension (Hofstede Insights, 2019). 
Individualism/collectivism refers to the degree to which members of a society are integrated 
into groups. This relates to whether a person holds a self-image of “I” versus a self-image of 
“we”. Individualist societies have loose ties, and everyone is expected to look after 
themselves. On the other hand, collectivist societies emphasize the interests of the group in 
their daily life. With a low score of 35, Sri Lanka is considered to be a collectivist society. 
Australia, in contrast, has a high score of 90 indicating that it is an individualist society 
(Hofstede Insights, 2019). 
The impact of the two dimensions of power distance and individualism on the constructs 
included in the research model is revisited, with specific hypotheses, below.   
 
Determinants of Acceptance of Government Surveillance  
 
Privacy concerns  
Privacy has been described as an “evanescent concept” (Gormley, 1992, p. 1336)  and one 
that is notoriously difficult to define (Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011). The definitional problem 
arises in part because privacy is likely to be differentially experienced depending on context: 
geographical, cultural, temporal and otherwise (e.g. Thierer, 2013; Whitman, 2003). Various 
and to some extent overlapping domains of privacy have been identified including 
information privacy, territorial privacy, bodily privacy and privacy of communications 
(Banisar & Davies, 1999). In terms of personal information, Dinev, Hart and Mullen (2008) 
report that 94% of Americans polled were worried (or very worried) about the misuse of that 
information. However, whereas threats to information privacy have traditionally been 
perceived as originating primarily from the private sector (private entities utilizing data for 
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commercial gain), increasingly such concerns are directed towards governmental national 
security and intelligence activities (Wilton, 2017). 
While privacy may elude a unitary definition, various scholars have argued that it should be 
understood in terms of control. Westin (1967; p.10), for example, defined privacy as “the 
right of the individual to decide what information about himself should be communicated to 
others and under what condition”. Although Westin’s definition may be contestable in 
contemporary times  (Wu et al., 2019), the importance of control over personal information is 
recognized in the General Data Protection Regulation (European Parliament, 2016, Recital 7) 
and control over personal information is clearly important to individuals (European 
Commission, 2016; Hallinan & Friedewald, 2012). Given that government surveillance 
involves collection and use of data in the online context, and given that surveillance is 
ubiquitous and a practice over which individuals have limited control, it might be expected 
that individuals who are concerned about the collection or use of their personal information 
would be less likely to accept government surveillance. Thus we hypothesize: 
H1: Privacy concerns regarding the collection of data will negatively influence the 
acceptance of surveillance in both cultures. 
H2: Privacy concerns regarding the secondary use of data will negatively influence the 
acceptance of surveillance in both cultures. 
 
Privacy Concerns: Cultural Influences 
Those in high power distance cultures are accustomed to an unequal distribution of authority. 
Hence, they are more likely to tolerate governmental interferences with privacy than those in 
low power distance cultures (Bandyopadhyay, 2009). In the consumer space, Wu, Huang, 
Yen, and Popova (2012) showed that the relationship between privacy concerns and 
acceptance of information collection is moderated by power distance. Milberg, Burke, Smith, 
and Kallman (1995) explain that individuals in countries high on the power distance index 
have lower levels of interpersonal trust.  As a consequence, individuals in those countries 
may not only accept but even desire greater government involvement, which is seen as a 
means to protect them. Moreover, as those from high power distance cultures are used to a 
hierarchical social structure they may be more accepting of information gathering from those 
in a position of authority (Cao & Everard, 2008) and the influence of any personal concerns 
may be weaker. Thus, we hypothesize: 
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H1a: The negative relationship between privacy concerns of collection and acceptance of 
surveillance will be weaker in cultures higher on power distance. 
H2a: The negative relationship between privacy concerns of secondary use and acceptance of 
surveillance will be weaker in cultures higher on power distance 
 
Perceived need for surveillance 
Government surveillance has various objectives, including prevention of crime, enforcement 
of revenue law,  and monitoring of voters (Bennett, 2015). However, a central purpose of 
surveillance is national security (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015; 
Reddick, Chatfield, & Jaramillo, 2015). Indeed, one of the main arguments raised by 
governments to justify the implementation of or increase in government surveillance is the 
need to protect its citizens from harm by preventing and responding to threats to national 
security in a more efficient manner (Allison, 2017; Porter, 2018). When large scale tragedies 
occur, lack of intelligence prior to the event is often cited as a contributing factor (Smith & 
Ferndando, 2019). Accordingly, an increase in government surveillance powers may be easier 
to justify in the wake of such tragedies. Following the terror attacks in Sydney, 2014, and 
Paris, 2015, for example, the Australian Government promoted the idea that a metadata 
retention scheme was essential to protect national security, even though many questioned 
whether the extent of the measures was proportionate (Suzor, Pappalardo, & McIntosh, 
2017). Moreover, public support for the extension of government surveillance powers might 
be galvanized by such events. Dinev et al. (2008) found that there was still broad support 
among US citizens for law enforcement to have even greater powers, albeit that the levels of 
support had declined slightly from those seen in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. More 
recently, a 2016 UK study regarding the move to expand surveillance powers of UK 
intelligence organizations found that 63% of those polled supported the expansion, with 27% 
claiming their opinion had “changed due to recent terror activities” (Computer Business 
Review, 2016). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3: Perceived need for surveillance will positively influence the acceptance of surveillance 
in both cultures. 
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Trust in government 
Within many advanced democracies, such as the US and UK, trust in government is an 
increasingly significant issue (Hardin, 2013; Intawan & Nicholson, 2018). Trust in 
government can be undermined for different reasons including, but not of course limited to, 
the extent to which governments manage information. In this regard, high-profile government 
intrusions into private lives, such as through unwarranted wire-tapping of phones (Baldwin & 
Shaw, 2006) and indiscriminate mass surveillance by government security agencies (Wilton, 
2017) have threatened trust in government and may influence perceptions of the ability of 
government agencies to adequately maintain data securely. However, whilst a significant 
proportion of US citizens express a lack of trust in government, Intawan and Nicholson 
(2018), report that the majority of US citizens maintain a positive implicit trust in 
government, whilst exhibiting a negative explicit trust.  
In addition to high-profile leaks occurring in the US, it has been recently reported that a 
database storing sensitive biometric data and other personal information and integrated with a 
system used by numerous countries and government services, including the UK Metropolitan 
Police Force, was easily accessible to third parties and “largely unsecured” (Jain, 2019). In 
Australia, the leaking of confidential documents has been prominent in the media in recent 
years (McGhee & McKinnon, 2018) and even prior to the implementation of the Australian 
metadata retention scheme law-enforcement agencies were under scrutiny for accessing web 
histories, without a relevant warrant (Grubb, 2014).   
Aside from the extent to which people trust the government to manage and secure 
information, general levels of trust in the government, or political trust may have a bearing on 
the extent to which citizens support government surveillance. Indeed, Davis and Silver (2004) 
found that the more trust citizens have in their government the more willing they are to accept 
government security measures. Likewise, Trüdinger and Steckermeier (2017) found a 
positive relationship between political trust and the support of surveillance measures in 
Germany. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H4: Trust in government will positively influence acceptance of surveillance in both cultures. 
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Privacy protections 
Various means are open to individuals to reduce their digital trails and avoid surveillance. 
These include the use of Tor, burner (disposable) phones, temporary email addresses and 
cash in preference to debit cards, as well through the encryption of digital communications 
(Joh, 2013). Wilton (2017) observed that consumers are becoming increasingly aware of the 
merits of using such obfuscating tools, and levels of use of privacy protections have increased 
in the US since the Snowden leaks (Rainie & Madden, 2015). According to Lyon (2003, 
p.675) “human beings are more flexible and imaginative than technologies” and thus possess 
the capacity to outsmart those technologies and, by so doing, evade surveillance. In the 
context of metadata retention, for example, simply utilizing a VPN, which can be obtained 
freely, will mean that much of the data intended to be captured will be unreadable to the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Use of such measures need not be an indication of 
criminality: it might simply represent a protest against the surveillance itself (Joh, 2013). 
However, the use of evasion tools can allow the intended targets of surveillance, such as 
criminals or terrorists, to evade detection (Ockenden, 2017).  
Researchers have found a positive association between higher levels of privacy concerns and 
greater efforts to protect individual privacy (Choi, Park, and Jung (2018). Similarly, research 
conducted by Pew Research Center found that 34% (n = 475) of those who were aware of the 
government surveillance programs exposed by former National Security Agency contractor 
Edward Snowden had changed the way they protected themselves, by utilizing at least one 
measure to shield themselves from government scrutiny (Shelton et al., 2015). For the same 
reason, 25% of individuals modified the way they used technology “a great deal” or 
“somewhat” (Shelton et al., 2015). In line with these findings we hypothesize:  
H5: Privacy concerns regarding the collection of data will positively influence use of privacy 
protections. 
H6: Acceptance of surveillance will negatively influence use of privacy protections. 
 
Privacy Protections: Cultural Influences 
Members of a collectivist society attempt to fit in with others and place more emphasis on 
groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, to fit in with the shared norms and protect 
each other’s privacy, they may be more likely to employ privacy protections. This is because 
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members are more concerned about the privacy harms that may be experienced by their 
collective (Posey et al. 2010). Trepte et al. (2017) examined the well-known privacy calculus 
framework in the context of culture, confirming that those with higher levels of collectivism 
did place a greater emphasis on privacy protections, presumably in order to safeguard their 
collective. Dinev, Goo, Hu, and Nam (2009) also showed that culture moderates the 
intentions to use protective technology; a finding which is associated with the cultural 
influence on perceptions about privacy (Milberg, Smith, & Burke, 2000). Consistent with 
Altman’s (1977) position that different cultures have different mechanisms for regulating 
their behavior and interactions, we hypothesize that: 
H5a: The positive relationship between privacy concerns and privacy protections will be 
stronger in collectivist cultures. 
H6a: The negative relationship between acceptance of surveillance and privacy protections 
will be weaker in collectivist cultures. 
Research Method  
An anonymous online survey was developed and administered using the Qualtrics platform. 
All participants were 18 or over and were residents of Australia and Sri Lanka. Australia was 
selected as a relatively low power distance and high individualism country, and Sri Lanka 
was selected as a relatively high power distance and high collectivism country. In Australia 
the language used in the survey instrument was English. For Sri Lanka, the survey was 
translated from English into Tamil and Sinhalese by native speakers. Data analysis was 
conducted using SPSS 25 and Smart PLS 2.0 packages for statistical and PLS structural 
equation modelling. 
The introductory section of the survey gathered general demographic information about 
participants including age and gender. The second section asked about the privacy-related 
perceptions and behaviors of participants. Where possible, the items to measure the 
constructs in the model were based on validated instruments from previously published 
research. Table 1 provides definitions of the constructs in the model and summarizes the 
sources of the items used to measure them.  
The items to assess respondents’ perceptions were measured on 5 point Likert scales from 1 
“Strongly Disagree” to 5 “Strongly Agree”. The trust items consider levels of trust in 
different government agencies, therefore this construct is a composite of multiple measures 
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and was modelled formatively (MacCallum & Browne, 1993). Privacy protections were 
assessed by asking respondents to indicate which of a list of ten privacy protective measures, 
they had adopted. An overall measure of privacy protections was calculated for each 
participant as the total number of privacy measures that they had adopted. All other 
constructs were modelled reflectively. 
Table 1: Survey Items 
Construct Definition Source + (No. of items) 
Privacy Concerns of 
Collection (PRIV-COLL) 
Individuals’ concerns 
that data about their 
personalities, background 
or activities are being 
accumulated. 
Smith, Milberg, and Burke 
(1996) (4) 
Privacy Concerns of 
Secondary Use (PRIV-SEC) 
Individuals’ concerns 
that any collected 
information may then be 
re-purposed or disclosed 
to other parties without 
authorization. 
Smith et al. (1996) (4) 
Perceived Need for 
Surveillance (NEED) 
Perception that 
government surveillance 
is necessary for the 
protection of citizens. 
Dinev et al. (2008) (4) 
Trust in Government 
(TRUST) 
Individuals’ level of trust 
in the government and 
legal system. 
Trüdinger and Steckermeier 
(2017) (3) 
Acceptance 
(ACCEPT)  
Individuals’ acceptance 
of modern online 
surveillance activities. 
Items based on types of 
metadata that are the subject 
of government retention 
schemes (e.g. IP address, 
phone call and location data) 
(5) 
Privacy Protections 
(PROTECT) 
Behaviors enacted to 
preserve online privacy. 
Shelton et al. (2015) (10) 
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Initial survey development was conducted in English, as the source items for the constructs 
had been previously published in English. The items to measure each construct were first pre-
tested by two academics to establish content validity, and the full questionnaire was then pilot 
tested with five respondents from Australia. Next, the survey was professionally translated to 
Tamil and Sinhalese, followed by a pre-test by an academic fluent in these languages. After 
the pre-test, the full questionnaire was then pilot tested with ten respondents from Sri Lanka 
(five for each survey version). In response to pilot testing feedback, minor changes were 
made to the wording and to streamline the interface. 
A convenience sample was recruited through snowball sampling, with the initial distribution 
being conducted through social networks, including LinkedIn and Facebook. The survey was 
open for data collection from mid-2018 to early 2019. Human Research Ethics Committee 
approval was obtained from our human research ethics committee before commencing data 
collection.  
Results and Analysis 
Following the closure of the data collection, incomplete responses were screened, leaving a 
total sample of 242 for data analysis - 100 from Australia and 142 from Sri Lanka (comprised 
of 76 Sinhalese Language and 66 Tamil language responses). There was even gender balance, 
with 45% and 47% female respondents in Australia and Sri Lanka respectively. The most 
common age grouping was 25-34 years (34% AU, 47% SL).  
Privacy concerns for collection (4.38-4.48) and secondary use (4.61-4.76) were generally 
high in both countries; most individuals strongly felt the need for protection of their privacy. 
The mean levels of trust (2.88-2.95) were slightly lower than neutral suggesting that, on 
average, respondents were lacking trust in their government. Perceived need for surveillance 
(2.92-4.17) was generally above neutral suggesting that respondents believe that there are 
some necessary elements to surveillance. 
The average individual utilized between three and four privacy protections out of a possible 
ten. The top two protections were the same in both countries: “changing your privacy settings 
on social media” and “using more complex passwords” both of which are easily 
accomplished by many individuals. Around a third of the sample used a VPN, while only 5-
10% had used Tor. Some individuals had adopted all of the individual privacy protections, 
while some had adopted none.  These findings are summarized below in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Construct Minimum Maximum Mean SD CR 
Australia  
PRIV-COLL 2.75 5 4.48 0.53 0.80 
PRIV-SEC 3.5 5 4.76 0.37 0.75 
NEED 1 4.75 2.92 0.99 0.93 
TRUST 1 5 2.95 0.89 * 
ACCEPT 1 5 2.70 1.25 0.96 
PROTECT 0 10 3.41 0.24 * 
Sri Lanka  
PRIV-COLL 2.25 5 4.38 0.55 0.74 
PRIV-SEC 2.75 5 4.61 0.51 0.46 
NEED 1.75 5 4.17 0.69 0.82 
TRUST 1 5 2.88 0.86 * 
ACCEPT 1 5 3.65 0.90 0.89 
PROTECT 0 10 3.08 2.16 * 
Note: Although the items to measure the constructs were measured using ordinal scales, reporting of 
mean and SD is appropriate (Norman, 2010). 
* CR only applicable for reflective constructs. 
 
Since a single questionnaire was used to measure all of the variables, we assessed the 
potential threat of common method variance (CMV) through a Harmon one-factor analysis. 
The results showed that the most variance explained by one factor was 36.3% in the 
Australian data set and 18.9% in the Sri Lankan data set. Therefore, CMV is unlikely to be a 
serious concern. The model was next tested with PLS, using a bootstrap resampling method 
with 2000 iterations to determine the significance of the paths.  
Internal consistency reliability was evaluated using composite reliability (CR) as 
recommended by Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016). All but one CR value exceeded the 
suggested threshold of 0.6 for exploratory research (see Table 2). Convergent validity was 
evaluated by testing that all item loadings were significant and through average variance 
extracted (AVE) – a measure of the amount of variance in the construct relative to 
measurement error. Most AVE’s were above or close to 0.5. According to Fornell and 
Larcker (1981), AVE below 0.5 is acceptable if the CR is above 0.6. This criterion was met 
for all constructs except PRIV-SEC and only in the Sri Lankan group. Thus, we can state that 
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convergent validity was established for the overall model, though the results for PRIV-SEC 
in the Sri Lankan group must be interpreted in light of the construct’s convergent validity 
results. Discriminant validity was tested by ensuring that the square root of AVE for each 
construct exceeded the correlations between that construct and any other construct, and this is 
summarized in Table 3. Thus, the measures of the reflective constructs demonstrated 
acceptable psychometric properties. 
 
Table 3: Construct correlations and square root of AVE on diagonal 
               1 2 3 4 5 6 
Australia       
ACCEPT    0.92                                              
PROTECT -0.27 1.00                                      
TRUST 0.55 -0.27 1.00                             
PRIV-COLL -0.31 0.19 -0.30 0.71                     
PRIV-SEC  -0.19 0.27 -0.14 0.43 0.66         
NEED 0.65 -0.28 0.61 -0.22 -0.18 0.87 
Sri Lanka        
ACCEPT  0.78                                              
PROTECT 0.07 1.00                                      
TRUST 0.16 -0.01 1.00                             
PRIV-COLL 0.04 0.30 -0.14 0.66                     
PRIV-SEC  -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.24 0.56         
NEED 0.26 0.24 0.07 0.20 0.26 0.74 
 
We then examined the structural model (see Figure 2). ACCEPT was negatively influenced 
by PRIV-COLL (ß = -.14, p < .001) for Australians, but not for Sri Lankans (ß = .04, p = .34) 
giving partial support for H1. ACCEPT was not influenced by PRIV-SEC in either culture 
(AU ß = -.01, p = .39; SL ß = -.16, p = .17) leading us to reject H2. ACCEPT was positively 
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influenced by NEED (AU ß = .50, p < .001; SL ß = .28, p < .001) and TRUST (ß = .21, p < 
.001, ß = .14, p < .05) in both cultures leading us to accept H3 and H4. 
PROTECT was positively influenced by PRIV-COLL in both cultures (AU ß = .12, p < .05; 
SL ß = .29, p < .001) supporting H5. PROTECT was negatively influenced by ACCEPT, but 
only in Australia (ß = -.23, p < .001; ß = .06, p = .24) lending partial support for H6. 
 
 
Fig 2: Structural model results 
 
There was, however, a difference in the ability of the model to explain the variance in 
acceptance of government surveillance in the two cultures. The R2 for ACCEPT was 0.48 for 
the Australians, but only 0.11 for the Sri Lankans. This suggests that other possible 
determinants of acceptance of government surveillance need to be considered.  
Next, we assessed the role of cultural differences using the formula of Keil et al. (2000) (see 
Table 4). The effect of PRIV-COLL on ACCEPT was significantly weaker for Sri Lankans 
(with a higher power distance) lending support for H1a. The relationship between PRIV-SEC 
use and ACCEPT was non-significant in both cultures so H2a could not be meaningfully 
evaluated and is not supported.  
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In terms of protective behaviors, the results indicate that PRIV-COLL more strongly 
influenced PROTECT for Sri Lankans (a collectivist society), leading us to accept H5a. 
Finally, the negative relationship between ACCEPT and PROTECT is weaker in Sri Lanka as 
hypothesized in H6a, providing support for the hypothesis. Table 5 summarizes the results of 
all of the hypothesis testing. 
Table 4: Path coefficient comparison 
  Australia  Sri Lanka  
      ß S.E. ß S.E. P  
PRIV-COLLACCEPT (H1a)  -0.14 0.03 0.04 0.07 p<.001 
PRIV-SECACCEPT (H2a)  -0.01 0.03 -0.16 0.12 NA 
PRIV-COLLPROTECT (H5a)  0.12 0.04 0.29 0.04 p<.001 
ACCEPTPROTECT (H6a) -0.23 0.05 0.06 0.05 p<.001 
Table 5: Summary of hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Result 
H1: Privacy concerns regarding the collection of data will negatively 
influence the acceptance of surveillance in both cultures 
Partially 
supported  
H1a: The negative relationship between privacy concerns of collection 
and acceptance of surveillance will be weaker in cultures higher on 
power distance. 
Supported 
H2: Privacy concerns regarding the secondary use of data will negatively 
influence the acceptance of surveillance in both cultures. 
Not 
supported 
H2a: The negative relationship between privacy concerns of secondary 
use and acceptance of surveillance will be weaker in cultures higher 
on power distance. 
Not 
supported 
H3: Perceived need for surveillance will positively influence the 
acceptance of surveillance in both cultures. 
Supported 
H4: Trust in government will positively influence acceptance of 
surveillance in both cultures. 
Supported 
H5: Privacy concerns regarding the collection of data will positively 
influence use of privacy protections. 
Supported 
H5a: The positive relationship between privacy concerns and privacy 
protections will be stronger in collectivist cultures. 
Supported 
H6: Acceptance of surveillance will negatively influence use of privacy 
protections. 
Partially 
supported 
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H6a: The negative relationship between acceptance of surveillance and 
privacy protections will be weaker in collectivist cultures. 
Supported 
 
Discussion 
One objective of this research was to investigate the determinants of acceptance of 
government surveillance. Privacy concerns about the collection of data were found to 
significantly influence acceptance of surveillance by Australian residents. However, such 
concerns did not influence acceptance of surveillance on the part of Sri Lankans. Thus, H1 
was only partially supported.  
Surprisingly, privacy concerns about secondary use of collected data appeared to play even 
less of a role in determining acceptance of surveillance. It did not influence acceptance in 
either group, leading us to reject H2. Although collection of data and secondary use of it are 
closely related concepts (i.e. it is common practice to store collected data for later 
repurposing), participants appear not to have associated the two. One explanation for this is 
that individuals may hold a simplistic mental model (Thompson & McGill, 2017) that 
surveillance is analogous to “watching” or “observing” and may not even consider the 
potential secondary use of this same data.  
The research also considers whether the influence of privacy concerns on acceptance of 
surveillance is affected by national culture. Hypotheses 1a-2a proposed that the strength of the 
relationships between privacy concerns and acceptance would vary due to differences in 
power distance in the two national cultures. H1a was supported as the relationship was 
stronger in the Australian group, that is, the country with lower power distance. As 
hypothesized, those from higher power distance countries appear to be more accepting of 
those in positions of authority collecting information (Cao & Everard, 2008), thus weakening 
the influence that privacy concerns otherwise have on acceptance of surveillance. As H2 was 
not supported for either group, it was not possible to meaningfully compare the difference 
between groups and thus H2a was not supported.  
In both cultures, those who believed that government surveillance was needed were more 
likely to accept surveillance, as were those who had trust in the government: thus, supporting 
hypotheses H3 and H4.  
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Privacy concerns about the collection of data were found to be a significant determinant of 
use of privacy protections in both cultures, as hypothesized in H5 and consistent with the 
findings of Choi et al. (2018). This relationship was stronger for the Sri Lankans (a 
collectivist culture) as hypothesized in H5a, reflecting a stronger desire to protect the privacy 
of their collective.  The stronger relationship might also be explained by the fact that 
countries higher on the power index, generally exhibit lower levels of interpersonal trust 
(Milberg et al. (1995)). However, acceptance of surveillance only had a negative influence on 
the use of privacy protections in the Australian group, thus H6 was only partially supported. 
Consistent with the partial support for H6, H6a was supported as the negative relationship 
between acceptance and privacy protection was stronger in the more individualistic culture 
(Australian). In addition to our proposed cultural differences, Dinev et al. (2009) note that 
differences in levels of knowledge about how to take protective action may also play a role in 
differences in technology related protective behavior between countries.  
 
Implications for research and practice 
The research model employed in this study is the first to integrate these constructs into a 
single model that may be adopted for future research. Findings from this study demonstrate 
that individuals’ perceived need for surveillance and trust in government are important 
predictors of acceptance of surveillance. This has practical implications, as history has shown 
that changes to government surveillance policies are often made as a reaction to tragic 
situations, and thus public acceptance of these hinges on the emotional response to these 
events (Reddick et al., 2015). Policymakers should exercise caution, however, as reliance on 
emotional responses could potentially lead to counter-productive effects if a similarly 
emotionally evocative story or campaign were to diminish perceived need for surveillance, 
leading to widespread rejection and evasion of government security policies. Arguably, this is 
particularly likely if such a campaign were to undermine public trust in the government, 
given that an individual’s general trust in the government significantly determines the 
acceptance of surveillance. At the time of writing, an example of this is playing out on the 
streets of Hong Kong where protestors have demanded the removal of public infrastructure 
over concerns that it is being used for surveillance by Chinese authorities (Associated Press, 
2019). Efforts to maintain transparency around the use of surveillance methods and 
techniques would potentially improve general public trust in the government and also lead to 
21 
 
sustained or even increased acceptance. Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal (2004) found that when 
individuals are informed about surveillance policies and when clear and transparent 
information is provided around what is collected, feelings of control are reinforced. 
Consistent with control-based conceptions of privacy, therefore, individuals who feel in 
control may not experience surveillance as interference with privacy, thereby increasing 
acceptance of surveillance.  
The cultural dimensions discussed are applicable at not only the national level but also at 
organizational and occupational levels (Helmreich & Merritt, 2017). Thus our findings have 
practical workplace implications since organizational cultures are acquired during the course 
of work, and may be influenced by the management (Hofstede, 2011). Squicciarini, Xu, and 
Zhang (2011) suggest that much of the literature considers “individual actions and has failed 
to recognize the need for privacy actions by groups” (p.522).  Likewise, Wu et al. (2019) 
have observed that “privacy management is negotiated not just at the individual level, but 
between many individuals at a group or community level” (p.5). Our findings provide a new 
dimension and support by showing that the cultural dimension of collectivism significantly 
improves the enactment of privacy protective behaviors in response to privacy concerns. This 
finding has potential impacts for the workplace context as staff uptake of privacy protections 
may be encouraged by emphasizing the collectivist aspects of these protections, that is, that 
such protections are beneficial to the entire organization. Similarly, if the broader internet is 
treated as a public and shared resource, then this may encourage uptake of protective 
behaviors in order to safeguard this shared resource for the collective. 
 
Limitations and future work 
This research was conducted in the midst of multiple, high-profile and heavily publicized 
privacy and security events, including the implementation of the General Data Protection 
Regulation in the European Union; the collection of up to 87 million Facebook users’ 
personally identifiable information by Cambridge Analytica; discussion around forcing 
technological organizations to provide a “backdoor” for security agencies in Australia; and 
the leaking of multiple classified pieces of information by Australian security agencies 
(McGhee & McKinnon, 2018). In Sri Lanka, terror attacks in early 2019 prompted 
discussions of the effectiveness of security agencies and led to nationwide suspensions of 
social media services in the days immediately following the incidents. These events brought 
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notions of privacy, security and trust into the spotlight and may have influenced the responses 
in the cohort. 
As noted, the variance explained by our model (R2) differed substantially between Australia 
and Sri Lanka, which suggests that other possible determinants of acceptance of surveillance 
could be considered. While our work considered the role of national culture in influencing the 
strength of the relationship between privacy concerns and acceptance of surveillance, it is 
possible that cultural norms could more directly determine acceptance, and future work could 
measure the extent, if any, to which this is the case. Furthermore, it is possible that individual 
micro-cultures may have their own subset of beliefs and perceptions which could influence 
the results. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil group has a minority status, and this may influence factors 
such as their general institutional trust in the government.  This is a dimension which may be 
explored in future work. 
The method of study recruitment was through a snowball sampling, with participants initially 
recruited through social media. By utilizing more systematic methods of sampling and 
gathering information from wider areas, it would be possible to attain a larger sample of the 
global population, which may support the generalizability of the findings.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that a third of respondents in both countries used a VPN. This 
single privacy protection is sufficient to counteract the objectives of government monitoring, 
as they apply to online metadata. Therefore, it may well be that respondents are selective in 
their adoption of protections and opt for quality over quantity or that those who adopt 
particular privacy protections (such as a VPN) are generally suspicious of government 
surveillance. This is an area that lends itself to further investigation.  
Conclusion 
As governments’ capacity to subject their citizens to surveillance increases, it is reasonable to 
assume that so too does their desire to acquire ever greater surveillance powers. Yet there are 
risks to governments lacking broad public mandate for such powers. Our study found that 
trust in government is one of the determinants of acceptance of surveillance. While trust in 
government is not limited to the way in which governments manage data, it is likely that 
“cyber trust” is an important component of this. Dutton et al (2005) explored the role of cyber 
trust in government and identified a “trust tension” between the need to collect data on 
individuals as the basis for providing services, and anxieties about data surveillance or the 
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inappropriate use of personal information gathered, stored, and analyzed using information 
technologies. Through this exploration, they identified strategies which governments could 
employ in order to enhance levels of trust: these included ensuring trustworthy identification 
in online systems, implementing guidelines and legal frameworks, and the use of third party 
certification. It is also possible that the relationship between trust in government and 
acceptance of government surveillance works both ways and that a lack of acceptance of 
surveillance is one factor that has the ability to undermine political trust and goodwill, 
thereby setting up a feedback effect. Hence, methods that lead to sustained or increased 
acceptance of surveillance, such as increased transparency around surveillance methods and 
techniques, may have the potential to improve general public trust in the government. 
Our study also found that privacy concerns about the collection of data were found to be a 
significant determinant of use of privacy protections in both cultures. In Australia, but not Sri 
Lanka, privacy concerns also significantly influenced acceptance of surveillance. Therefore, 
in Australia at least, a lack of acceptance of surveillance is more likely to result in the 
adoption of privacy protections which have the capacity to undermine surveillance efforts, 
and is therefore an important factor for governments to consider. Finally, our research found 
that national culture plays a role in acceptance of surveillance by influencing the extent to 
which some of the constructs studied influence acceptance. As such, the research contributes 
to a better contextual understanding of surveillance and privacy. 
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